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I. Introduction 
Accounting for why some countries grow faster than others for long periods of 
time is a topic that has received considerable attention over the last few decades. It has 
been extensively studied in McKinnon [1973] and Shaw [1973], and more recentlY 'J~ 
Bencivenga and Smith [1991], Greenwood and Jovanovic [1990], King and Levine [1991] ~~~, 
~P''l and Pagano [1993]. Although most of the earlier work was based on Robert Solow's neo- I 
classical growth model developed in the 1950s, more recent work, over the last five years 
or so, uses the newer endogenous growth models. Robert Solow's growth model 
theorized that a country's level of output depended on its labor force, its stock of capital 
and a measure for exogenous technological progress. This model had no significant role 
for financial intermediation in determining growth. Financial intermediation could be 
linked to the level of capital stock or the productivity level, but not to growth rates. 
~ """.... Growth rates were only the result of exogenous technological progress. 
elf Recent insights and techniques ~ant that endogenous technological progress 
can now be incorporated i~ the model. This pape~tends the growth literature by 
. rY r.:;,'" investigating the importance of financial markets ,?Kgrowth rates. It uses an extension of 
. 1\ \ ~K' growth model based on the work by Romer [1989] and King and 
\}-fj> ~r- Levine [1993], to show that growth rates can be related to financial intermediation. In this 
~LIJX 
V 
way )sing endogenous technological change, it is possible to relate the growth rate to 
financial intermediation so that fmancial intermediation hali level effects as well as growth 
rate effects. 
Two main relationships between finance and growth are often emphasized: i) the 
role that financial markets have in channeling savings towards investment and ii) the 
informational problems that financial markets are able to solve that would otherwise lead 
to inefficient outcomes. This paper ~o;h';~~'re prospective entrepreneurs 
are evClluated by financial markets on their ability to come up with a successful innovation 
t r- -\V-C 1\ 





markets loans are made to those who are the most likely to come up with marketable 
~~ . 
innovations. Because marketable innovations lead to higher growth'fcountries that have 
}-:.~ 
more developed financial systems will have ~growth rates. My work differs from 
previous work in this area in that it differentiates the effects of the domestic financial 
markets from those of the foreign fmancial markets in allowing for the impact of an 
increasingly global financial system on an economy. 
The paper is divided into 7 sections. Section IT gives some background on the 
financial markets in developing countries as some of the countries have started moving 
towards more liberalized financial markets. Section ill then reviews some of the different 
theoretical models of endogenous growth and fmancial development, including those by 
Bencivenga and Smith [1991], Saint-Paul [1990], Levine [1991] and Pagano [1993]. 
Section IV summarizes the model on which the theoretical work in this paper is based. 
Specifically, it looks at an endogenous growth model developed by King and Levine 
[1993] that links finance, entrepreneurs and economic growth. This model is based on the 
Knightian role1 of entrepreneurs initiating economic activity and the Schumpeterian view2 
c,:-;,\::Jk~ .s~, ~ .-.<J .L.( 
that innovations are induced by a search for temporary monopoly profits. aJ.lEi-tfta.t financial 
institutions are importClIlt because they evaluate and finance entrepreneurs. 
In Section V, I present my model. This model extends the King and Levine model 
by adding to it variables that separate the effects due to domestic financial markets from 
those due to international financial markets. The model gives us a better understanding of 
the implications that an increasingly global financial system has on a developing country's 
growth rate. Section VI investigates the empirical support for the model. Specifically, it 
studies the effects of adding various measures of the openness of financial systems to the 
production function. This section also examines the empirical work of King and Levine 
and compares different measures of efficiency and size of the financial market. Measures 
IFrank Knight (1951) 
2Joseph Schumpeter (1911) 
2 
such as financial depth, domestic credit and claims of the private sector are compared 
a~t each other. Data from a number of emerging stock markets is also added as a new 
measure of the size and efficiency of the financial system and to better explain the 
relationship between the financial development and economic growth. Section vn 
concludes the paper and discusses the implications of some of the results from the 
empirical work. 
II. Background 
Before looking at the history of financial markets in developing countries, it is 
important to understand the significance of well developed financial institutions and the 
role that they play in development. Financial services make it cheaper and less risky to 
trade in goods and services and to borrow and lend. They do so by taking the resources 
from one group of individuals and providing them to another group who have more 
productive uses for the resources, thereby raising the incomes of both the saver and the 
borrower. AlthOUgh~e:;'yS of raising capital, such as inves!lJlent by the public sector 
or self-financing, unlike market driven financial syste~vestments are not 
competitively determined. In a competitive financial system, the transaction costs are held 
down, the risk is allocated to those who are willing to take ~d only those who think 
they can make a profit from borrowing end up investing. . 
A competitive financial system can take on many forms, including informal finance 
from pawnbrokers and moneylenders as is the case in many developing countries. 
However, as economies develop there is a need for services that can only be provided by 
formal institutions. For example, by transforming the size and maturity of financial assets, 
formal institutions can mediate between the many small depositors who prefer liquid assets 
and the large borrowers who need long-term loans for larger projects. A financial system 




so that an economy with a more developed financial sector will see an increase in ) crA-..----
investment, and therefore an increase in its growth rate.3 
The economies of the developing countries in the 1950s and 1960s were based " / v V' 
mainly on the import of manufactured goods and the export of agricultural product I A 
process of rapid industrialization and agricultural modernization was taking place, and the 
governments felt that financial market reforms were needed to get the financial sector to 
support their modernization efforts. At the time, the formal financial sector mainly 
consisted of a few institutions, usually foreign-owned banks, which only had branches in 
the major cities and served mainly~arge multinational companies. There were few 
sources of equity and long-term finance for local industries and what was available was 
expensive. It is not difficult to understand why, as part of their development strategies, 
many of the governments felt the need to exercise more control over their country's 
financial sector. 
As a result, many governments ended up creating new financial institutions to 
provide funding at low interest rates to industries in sectors that were important to their 
development projects. They nationalized their commercial banks and directed them to 
follow the government's agenda. The governments themselves also borrowed heavily 
from the domestic financial system and abroad (see figure 1), both to finance government 
deficits and to meet the needs of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The banks were 
directed to open branches in rural areas t''LLrov~de credit to smaller enterprises. The 
governments also put credit allocati0dkd in:r~st rate ceilings on both the private and 
public fmancial intermediaries. 
The effects of these policies were reflected in the damage done to the financial 
sectors in the 1970s and 1980s. Under government pressures, banks did lend to SOEs and 
3World Development Report 1989, Financial Systems and Development. The World Bank, Oxford 
University Press. p. 54-69. 
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Figure 1: 
Central Government Borrowing 




Source: World Development Report, 1989 
priority sectors, at below market interest rates thus not adequately reflecting the risks 
involved in these industries. With government backing, many of the state enterprises 
defaulted on their loans. Interest rate controls meant that domestic savers were 
discouraged from holding financial assets locally and the controls prevented riskier or 
tv .. \J~ longer-term investments from being made. In some countries, government and public 
')( {" borrowing from commercial banks crowded out private investment from taking place, 
~I i), 'l while in othe~pan~was a result of money being created for government 
>~rr.} , '" cf investment. For example, in India about half of the bank assets had to be held on reserve 
~V( 
to meet the reserve requirements or else held as government bonds, and 40 percent of the 
remainder had to be lent to priority sectors at controlled interest rates. In Brazil in 1987, 
government credit programs accounted for more than 70 percent of the credit outstanding 
to the public and private sectors4• 
Figure 1 shows the breakdown of central government borrowing in developing 
countries. The majority of borrowing is from the Central Bank where almost 47% of the 
borrowing is done to finance the deficit. A near second is the borrowing from foreign 
sources at almost 38%. When compared to developed nations, where most of the 
4World Development Report 1989. Financial Systems and Development. The World Bank, Oxford 
University Press. p. 55. 
5 
borrowing is from private domestic sources, this shows how dependent developing 
countries are on foreign private and government borrowing. 
Only recently have developing countries begun to acknowledge the problems that .. ( 
their interventionists approach ~aused. Their directed credit programs have become ~~ Y1 
non-performing loans. The ability to borrow at cheap rates has encouraged less 
productive investment. Those who borrowed for projects with low returns were unable to 
repay while others willingly defaulted knowing that no action would be taken against those _ 1 1 
in priority sectors. In a sample of eighteen development financial institutions (DFIs) ~~~ f I~" 
worldwide, on average nearly 50 percent of their loans (by value) were in arrears, and 7 
accumulated arrears were equivalent to 17 percent of the portfolio valu~nterest rate 
controls and high inflation have also had adverse affects on financial development. In fact 
in countries that have maintained low and stable inflation through prudent monetary and 
fiscal policies, financial growth has been rapid. Malaysia's financial depth (measured as a 
ratio of M2 to GNP) rose from 31 percent of GNP in 1970 to 75 percent in 1987. On the 
other hand, Argentina which has suffered from high inflation has seen its financial depth 
drop from 30 percent of GNP in 1970 to around 18 percent by 1987. Increasingly. 
developing countries are changing their policies and are moving towards more liberalized 
economies, as they realize that development of the financial sector requires them to 
minimize their control over the increasingly complex financial sector and allow the market 
forces to have greater ~tial control over interest rates and credit allocation . 
. r{ ,,:,\\10,) (\ tJ-
\f\~ 
III. Literature Review 
The relationship between financial intermediation and economic growth has been 
studied extensively over the last five years. This section reviews the theoretical models 
and empirical work from a number of different papers that try to explain the potential 
effects of financial markets on growth. The theoretical review involves work by Pagano 
5Ibid. p. 60. 
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[1993], Saint-Paul [1991], Fry[1994], Bencivenga and Smith [1991], Levine [1991] and 
King and Levine [1993]. Review of empirical work is from King and Levine [1993]. 
Pagano [1993] gives an overview of the various effects of financial development 
on growth by examining some ways in which financial markets influence the growth rate 
of output. First, Pagano looks at the funneling of savings to finns, and explains how in 
transforming savings to investment, financial markets absorb some of the resources. The 
fraction that is absorbed goes to the banks and is the spread between the lending and 
., eo1W~~h th-.1 
borrowing rates. By reducing this spread through financial development an economy can 
increase its growth rate. Also, financial markets determine the allocation of funds, and 
they want to invest in projects where the marginal product of capital is highest. This they 
do by collecting infonnation to evaluate alternative investment projects and allowing risk 
sharing so that agents may invest in riskier technologies. Thus there is a more efficient 
allocation of resources and higher productivity. 
Saint-Paul [1991] looks at the relationship between financial development and the 
growth rate through the impact that financial markets have on technological choice. The 
reasoning is that a country can achieve higher productivity growth through a greater 
division of labor, and this specialization will lead to more efficiency and therefore higher 
productivity growth. The role of the financial markets is to permit this greater division of 
labor by allowing agents to hold a diversified portfolio, allowing them to spread the risk 
involved in being more specialized. Without the financial markets there would be less 
specialization and agents would choose technologies that were easily adaptable to different 
uses and were therefore less risky. However, the flexible technologies would also mean 
lower Producti~~roWth and may even lead to a more backward state of development in 
the economy. 
The paper uses the linkages between financial markets and technological choice to 
explain the differing stages of development across countries. It basically says that in 
countries where financial markets are underdeveloped people choose the more flexible 
7 
technologies (as explained above), but in doing this they encounter little risk, meaning that 
there is no incentive to develop financial markets. On the other hand countries with 
developed financial markets will have a greater need for financial markets. Thus an 
economy with a highly developed fmancial markets will be able to achieve a higher level of 
development than an economy in which they are not very developed. 
Bencivenga and Smith [1991] construct a model where financial intermediaries 
shift the composition of savings towards capital by reducing the effects of the agents' 
random liquidity needs. Agents in this model accumulate capital and an unproductive 
liquid asset. Financial markets reduce unnecessary capital liquidation, through pooling of 
funds and are able to alter the savings such that it is favorable for capital accumulation. 
Then because the higher capital accumulation affects the real growth rate, financial 
markets promote growth. Specifically, they use a three-period-lived overlapping-
generations model where each agent has an illiquid investment and a more liquid but less 
productive investment. The agents who make saving decisions, could have the need to 
liquidate their assets prematurely for whatever reason. Thus there is an incentive for 
banks to form and hold liquid reserves that will meet the liquidity needs of the agents 
based on some predictable withdrawal demand. Finally, they conclude that with the more 
active banking sector the economy will see higher growth rates. 
The article on stock markets and growth by Levine [1991] uses a model similar to 
that used by Bencivenga and Smith. Levine shows another way in which liquidity risks 
can be better shared, through the securities market. According to his model an 
inopportune need for liquidity can be met by selling shares on the stock exchange rather 
than withdrawing money from a bank. By selling shares, those who need liquidity hand 
over the risks to other investors who are willing to stay illiquid. The result is that capital 
is not prematurely withdrawn from the firm. The stock market at the same time also 
allows agents to reduce their risks by portfolio diversification. This would allow agents to 
8 
invest in more illiquid but also more productive projects. In this way, the stock market 
raises the productivity of investment and therefore the growth rate. 
Fry [1994] looks at whether or not there are particular characteristics of small 
economies that might suggest alternating sequencing or differing emphasis on components 
in a program of financial sector reform. He uses an endogenous growth model of the form 
Y = K U X ~, where K represents a combination of physical capital and know ledge and X is 
a factor such as land or labor. Fry then looks at a number of different policies that need to 
be followed or sequenced for small economies to have successful financial reform. This, 
according to Fry, should start with reforming the interest rate regime, to recapitalizing and 
restructuring financial institutions, developing long-term capital markets and finally to 
developing foreign exchange markets through more liberalization. He concludes by saying 
that a number of difficulties remain in trying to reform small developing economies, 
especially in terms of how much liberalization should take place and how fast this should 
take place. 
The paper by King and Levine [1993] looks at financial markets as increasing the 
probability of successful innovation and therefore accelerating the rate of economic 
growth. They develop an endogenous growth model in which they incorporate the role of 
entrepreneurs in initiating economic activity. Using the idea that innovations are induced 
by a search for temporary profits and that financial institutions are important because they 
evaluate and fmance entrepreneurs, they develop a model to show the effects on an 
economy's productivity growth. 
The King and Levine model can be broken down into three main steps. First they 
develop a model for how financial markets make the decision as to which entrepreneurs 
should be allowed to undertake innovative activity. Next, they link innovation to growth, 
and finally they derive the equilibrium condition between financial markets and the growth 
rate. 
9 
In linking financial intermediation with innovation King and Levine identify four 
areas where the services of financial markets are needed to make innovation more 
efficient. These are i) evaluating the viability of the prospective entrepreneurs projects, as 
there are large fixed costs involved that require specialized organizations to perform the 
tasks, ii) the size of the projects means that it is necessary to pool the funds of many small 
savers, again requiring financial markets, iii) because of the uncertain outcomes from 
innovation, it is necessary to diversify risks, which financial intermediaries do efficiently, 
and iv) some mechanism is needed to value the expected profits that any particular 
innovative activity will have, and once again financial markets can do this most efficiently. 
In linking innovation to growth King and Levine basically use a model in which 
innovations are cost reducing and allow an entrepreneur to temporarily reap monopoly 
profits by producing at a cost that is below that of the industry. In this way the rate of 
innovations determines the rate of productivity growth and therefore economic growth. 
IV. Theoretical Model 
In the next few pages, I first review the model developed by King and Levine 
[1993], before going on in section V to develop a model that incorporates the effects of 
international financial markets on an economy's productivity. King and Levine, as 
explained previously, base their work on the Schumpeterian model offmancial 
intermediation, which divides up the role of financial services into those of entrep~neurialt .. 
. ,c, ')0 II-} ;,T 
selection and the provision of finance from a pool of savings. 'J/V ~'-;:. ",-/t 
'fJ It \f" (, 
We start with the assumption of an economy with m'a.!ly individuals, with N units 
of time and financial wealth, which is a claim on the profits of firms. The financial 
intermediaries first need to determine which of the prospective entrepreneurs are to be 
funded. Each prospective entrepreneur has a project (that needs to be funded) and has the 
skills to manage the project capably Wit~o the first task of the financial 
intermediaries is to determine which individuals are the most capable of handling their 
10 
(
' ' r /I.I~ 
I b' I 
projects. This can be determined at a cost off units of labor. If w is the wage rate then wf 
will be the cost of evaluating a prospective entrepreneur. Now if the market value of a 
rated entrepreneur is q then in a competitive financial market the zero profit condition is 
~aq= Wf (1) 
So the expected income from rating an entrepreneur, aq, must equal the cost of evaluating 
the prospective entrepreneurs, wJ. 
( ~~ A rated entrepreneur then needs to realize a marketable innovation. For this the 
\) entrepreneur requires x units of labor, and at the end can expect to have a successful 
innovation with probability 1t. A successful innovation would mean that the entrepreneur 
will capture monopoly profits, and so we can look at the present value of the returns as 
P t+M,t V t+M where p is the discount factor at time t for cash flows at t + fl.t and.~s the 
! 
future stock market value of the firm, at time t + fl.t. Expected returns to the financial 
intermediary would then g~~V' - wx. Adding a tax rate 't on the gross i~'e-.Of the 
I!!::::?f- w: --financial intermediary, we can incorporate (1-'t) as the fraction of the total expected 
returns that are the financial intermediary'S income stream from financing the firm. Thus 
the value of a rated entrepreneur can be given by the innovation rent specification as 
q = (1- 't)1tP wx (2) 
~~w~ IA~ c.fk-' ~ ~ .- e.nb 
So in equation (2), the return to the financial intermediary is equal to the present value of 
~11\QJrv~ 
the expected j)l'ofits after taxes less the total cost of innovation. 
Combining the two forms of the equation for the rated entrepreneur gives the 
following eqUilibrium condition for equations (1) and (2). Substituting for q in both the 
equations and solving for the expected revenues from the activity we get 
a[(1 - 't)1tPV' - wx] = wf 
, w(f+ax) 






and so the equilibrium in the financial intermediary sector requires 
1tPV' = wa( 't), (3) 
where a('t) = (f/a. + x)/( l-'t) and is a combination of the full labor requirements for an 
innovation project given by a(O) = (fla. + x) and 't is the tax on entrepreneurial activity, 
and can be in the form of explicit financial sector taxes or those arising from distortions in 
the financial sector. Labor requirements can be broken down into two parts. The fla. is 
the labor necessary to evaluate prospective entrepreneurs divided by the probability of 
selecting the entrepreneurs, and x is the incumbent firm's labor requirements. Thus 
equation (3) says that in equilibrium the expected market value of the firm (LHS of the 
equation) is equal to the combined costs of intermediation, innovative activity and tax on 
the financial intermediaries. I _/ 
"--- jve"" U 
In this model an innovation at time t means that the entrepreneur will capture 7 L J +> () 
monopoly profits from the innovation, equal in value to the stock market value ofthi ~,.u})Gj " 
monopolist. But this also means that there will be a corresponding capital loss on the 
currently dominant firm. If we take vt to be the current stock market value of an 
incumbent finn (prior to distribution of dividends 0,), then the equilibrium condition for 
holding a share of stock from time t to t +!It is 
(4) 
letting TI represent the probability that some entrepreneur will successfully innovate, the 
above expression can be looked at as the current value of the firm (on the RHS) equaling 
the expected value of the present value P I+&,t v 1+& of the firm, taking into account capital 
losses TI. 
To explain the link between financial intermediation and productivity growth 
through technology, King and Levine develop a Schumpeterian model of technological 
12 
If' 
progress. They start with an economy with a continuum of products indexed by 00 on the 
interval 0 ~ co ~ 1, which are subject to technological improvements. Productivity levels 
are given by A such that innovations by entrepreneurs move the products technology up a 
ladder with stepsj=O,l, ... , giving higher levels N of productivity. The technological j) 71 
innovations only apply to intermediate goods production, which are all inputs into a single 
final good, C,. 
If y/oo) is the physical output of the intermediate product 00, At is the level of 
productivity at time t in industry 00, and n/oo) is the level of labor input, then we can see 
i 
that y/oo) = A/oo)n/co) = Nn/oo). Now with a wage rate of ~~.t~unit costs are 
wtnt(oo) wt _ wt ~ W h(0) 
Yt (00 ) = ~ ( 00) - N /1"6 d c. 
~J v, 
J 
Since the lead firm in the industry produces at a cost lower than other firms (as explained 
above), then we can assume that by pricing its products at its rivals' costs, the lead firm 
will still make a profit. So if the price of the intermediate good is given by p/oo), then the , 
factor demands are Zt (co) = Ct / Pt (00), where Ct is the final good produced, such that the 
output of all the intermediate goods y/oo), are inputs to the final good. Thus the lead 
firm's costs are wt / ~ (00) and it charges a price of Pt = AWt / ~ (00) based on markup from 
its costs. The stream of profits earned by the lead firm are 
Bt(co) = Pt(oo)yt(oo)-wtnt(oo), 
Bt( 00) = AW
t ~ (00 )nt(oo) - wtnt( 00), 
At (00) 
Bt(co) = mwtnt(oo) where m = (A-I) or the net markup. 
The above framework can be summarized by showing how the aggregate 
productivity growth at a time t + M depends on the productivity growth at a time t and on 




_ {Ar(ro)A with probability (TI)At } 
AI+&(ro) - A/ro) withprobability(1-TI)At 
(5) 
We now look at the general equilibrium for the model. This splits the problem into 
a production-side relation, which looks at the linkages between interest rates and growth 
and a preference-side relationship which looks at the optimal consumption choice. 
Production-side relationships are identified by three equilibrium conditions: the financial 
intermediation equilibrium conditions, the stock market equilibrium conditions and the 
labor market equilibrium conditions. The financial equilibrium conditions are derived from . /: 11"-J 
(,-TT)r/l - , -i 
those given above, as follows. Equation (3) can be written as ~ ~ . tk"- It 'f /,/; 11 e l ;: ':..- d ) 
lltv~Wt{{-r) J}; iJ I;" C-r- (W" Vi (1/ 
TtVt = a('t)wt , ~ f (6) 
since Pt+&,r V 1+& is the present value of the future stock price of the firm and this is t~ ~ 
same as the value of the firm today, vt • Also, from equation (4) it follows that 
dvrfdt = TIvr - or +r,Vr (7) 
where r is the instantaneous real interest rate, such that Pl+&,r = exp(r,At), and dvrldt is 
the time derivative of the stock price. 




n + a(O)e = N, 
where N, the total stock of labor, is allocated betweei jthe quantity of labor required for 
production of the intermediate goods, and a(O)'f:}he quantity of labor involved in fmancial 
"--' 
intermediation and innovation. 
The stock market equilibrium can be determined using the assumption that stock 
prices will grow with dividends at the rate of productivity growth ",. Thus we can add the 
condition that the growth rate of the stock market value of the firm, dv /dt = "IVr• By --- ... , 
combining the above condition with (7) we get the following stock market equilibrium 
condition 
14 
or VI = B/(r-y+TI) (9) 
With r, B and TI as fixed, one can see that an increase in the growth rate, 'Y tends to raise 
the stock market value of the fIrm. 
Now we can determine the production side relationship for the equilibrium 
condition based on the three equilibrium conditions given above. By combining the above 
equations with the assumption that the total innovation probability TI depends on 1te, and 
using the profIt condition for pricing intermediate goods, Otero) = mw,n,(ro), also given 
above, we derive the equilibrium production-side relation starting with equation (6): 












+(y/'A) sincey = TI'A from(S) 
B/w a( T.) = 1t ----'-- -
r-(I-l/'A)"{ 
mn 
a(T.) = 1t--- --
r-(1-1I'A)y 
(10) 
where 'A=log(A). Using TI=1te, n+a(O)e=N and 'Y=TI'A, and solving equation (10) for the 
interest rate we get the following 
a(T,)[r-(I-I/ 'A)y] = 1tmn 
1tmn 
r = -+(1-1I'A)y 
a(T.) 
r = 1tm(N-a(O)e) +(1 - 1I'A)y 
aCt) 
_ [1tm(N-a(O)e)](l ) 'A-I r - -T. +--y 
a(O) 'A 
[





r = T-llm (1 - 't)+~Y [
my ] A-I 
tJt. 
~
/ - /;'1\ 
, . rt', I < 
\ l&1 . /-;; /' '} 4 ) \ ,\ ---< ;;,; . 
m - 1 
r = -(l - 't)Y - IIm(1 - t)+Y+-Y 
A A 
, "( -::. V'- f) 
r=[I -~ -~ (H)Jr+[~ (1 - <)]1 (10') f<-d'fr~1,-' 
_ _ '-"~ J/(~ ~(~(I.~~tr (~ 
where y is the maximum feasible growth rate, defIned b€ N'A:!t I a(~ Eq~"~ (10') 1 :'0 
clarifies the relationship between the tax. rate 't and the interest rate r for any given growth / 
rate. When the growth rate is Y = r, then the interest rate is rcY) = (1-11 A) for all tax 
rates, and similarly when the growth rate is zero we get reO) = (ml A)(1-t), so that an 
increase in t lowe?the intercept on the r axis. Thus, as shown in figure 2, there is an 
unambiguous inverse relationship between the real return, r and the tax rate, 'to 
Next we determine the preference side relationship of our equation. The 
preferences are based on the savings behavior of an immortal family with a utility function 
of the form U t = fo- u( c/+,)e -IPS cIs ._ There are two parameters that describe the inter-
~ 
temporal preferences: the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, 1/0', and 
the rate of time preference, <po So the preference side relation between r and 'Y is given by 
y = [r -- ",]/0", (11) ~ he, 
Using equations (10) and (11), we can now detennine the equilibrium growth rate as '!;r.~~6 
'YO'+<P = [I-~ - :Y(1 - 't)}f+[:(1-'t)]Y ~ 
[ 
1 m- ] m-y O' - l+-+-y(1 - t) = -y(1 - 't) - <p 
A A A 
(12) 
The growth rate thus depends on a number of factors. On the preferences side it is higher 
for lower <p, i.e. discounting the future less or for lower 0' which means more willing to 
substitute through time. Also growth is higher when the economy is more productive, and 
16 
it depends positively on the extent of markups m and negatively on the losses on investors 
due to innovations (l/A). The parameter 't is the real variable of interest in the above 
equation and this can be used to study the links between the development of the financial 
sector and the growth rate. 
King and Levine [1993] break down the effects of the financial taxes 't into explicit 
and implicit financial sector taxes. Examples of explicit taxes include taxes on the gross 
receipts of banks, value added taxes, taxes on loan balances, taxes on financial transactions 
and taxes on intermediary profits. Implicit taxes include non-interest bearing reserve 
requirements, forced lending to state enterprises and to industries in priority sectors, and 
interest rate ceilings on various loans and deposits. The interaction of the taxation with 
the real return and the growth rate is described below. 
Figure 2 shows the interaction of the upward sloping preference-side or Ramsey 
'curve and the Romer curves on the downward-sloping production side. The preference 
side Romer curve is fairly straight forward in showing that a higher <p, representing more 
impatience, would move the curve upward, and a higher value of 0' for more risk averse 
individuals would steepen the curve by rotating it about its intercept. 
The production side shows two Romer curves, representing the zero-cost or gross 
Romer curve, the solid downward sloping curve, and the dashed curve representing the 
effect of including a cost of financial intermediation into the production-side relationship. 
Starting from the solid curve and moving it downward, it is evident from the illustration 
that the effect of this would be to lower growth as the tax rate is increased. This can be 
seen from looking at the section W in the dashed Romer curve. This shows a that there is 
a cost to [mancial intermediation that creates a wedge between the return to savers [R2] 
and the cost to the investors [Rl]. Thus the cost of intermediation is to reduce the growth 
rate from [G2] to [Gl]. So the way to increase growth is by reducing the size of the 
wedge. This means reducing the cost of financial intermediation and moving to a steeper 
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Figure 2: Financial Intennediation Costs, Growth, and Rates of Return 
Rate of Return 
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Source: Sequencing Financial Sector Reform and Development in Small Economies, Fry M.. 1994 
Romer curve through increased financial development. In this way, a lower cost of 
financial intennediation would result in a higher growth rate. 
One way to reduce the cost of financial intennediation and thereby move the 
Romer curve back up is through foreign intennediation. By introducing foreign banks into 
the economy we can see the effect that these would have on the cost of financial 
intermediation and therefore the growth rate. The next section incorporates the role of 
foreign fmancial intennediaries into the model to see the role that these play in the 
development of the economy. 
V. Extensions to the King & Levine Model 
Using the model from the previous section I now go on to separate the effects of 
domestic financial markets from those of international financial markets. In modifying the 
original model to include some measure of how foreign financial markets may increase 
economic development by providing some of the services, I changed the labor market 
eqUilibrium condition, equation (8) to reflect the fact that international financial markets 
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allow more labor to be directed towards the actual production of goods and towards 
innovative activity, by reducing the amount of labor resources needed in financial 
intermediation. Some of the resources that were originally used in the domestic financial 
intermediaries would now be unnecessary since foreign financial intermediaries would 
absorb part of their activities of evaluation, resource pooling, etc. Thus the new labor 
market equilibrium can be represented by the following equation 
n+f3(fja)e+xe = N (13) 
where f3 is the fraction of financial intermediation resources that are supplied by labor in 
the domestic financial markets. Thus the total labor, N is allocated as follows: n, as 
before, is the labor required for production. However, the labor requirements of financial 
intermediation would only be a fraction f3 of the original requirement, thus giving the 
f3(f ja)e term. Also, xe (labor required for innovation) remains the same as innovative 
activity still requires the same amount of labor as before. 
Adding the above to the production-side equilibrium relationship, starting with 
equation (10) to solve for the interest rate using the new labor market equilibrium 
condition, we get 
Substituting (13) for n: 
a( 't)[ r - (1 - ljA.)y] = 1Tmn, 
a('t)r = 1Tmn +a('t)(1-1/A.)'Y , 
1Tmn 
r = -(1- 't) + (l - ljA.)y 
a('t) 
1tm(N - f3[f 10. + x ]e)(1- 't) A.-1 
r = +---y 
fla+x A. 
r = f3e1Tm (1- 't) + ---y [ 
rrmN ] A.-1 
fla+x A. 
Using the maximum feasible growth equation (y = NArc / a(O» from section IV to 





This equation is similar to equation (10'), the difference being of course the variable ~ that 
shows up in 'Y and y. Although equation (14) better summarizes the overall effect of the 
variables in a fonn that is similar to equation (10'), the effect of ~ is probably better 
explained by the previous one, equation (14'). Here the effect of the variable ~ can clearly 
be seen as positively related to the real interest rate. This means that with a higher 
fraction of domestic financial intennediation, the real interest rate rises. The effect of the 
other variables on the ~ variable can also be determined from this equation. The impact of 
~ is increased with a smaller tax rate on financial intennediation, since a smaller tax rate 
means a higher value of (1- 't). Also a higher value of the difference between the 
maximum feasible growth rate y and the growth rate of output 'Y would increases the 
value of the ~, meaning that the greater the potential for growth in the economy the higher 
will be the effect on the interest rate through more domestic intennediation. The positive 
relation between the domestic financial intennediation and the real interest rates seems to 
imply that for higher levels of ~, there will be more capital inflows because of higher 
interest rates. This can be understood best if we recognize that for capital inflows to take 
place at all, there need to be some level of domestic financial sector services available to 
channel the inflow of funds, whether the funds are from foreign financial intermediaries or 
from foreign governments. 
The rate of change of the real interest rate with respect to the fraction of domestic 
intennediation can be derived as 
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ar = m(1-'t)(y-y) 7 0 
a~ A. 
From this we see that the rate of change of the r with respect to ~ increases with a higher 
markup value. It also increases with a lower tax rate and a lower level of productivity. 
Interestingly, the second derivative is zero, so that the relationship between the real 
interest rate and the domestic financial intermediation value will be a linear one. 
Next we determine the new equilibrium growth rate for the economy, starting with 
the preference side growth rate of output, equation (11), and substituting equation (14), 
the new interest rate equation which includes the derivation using the variable ~, into this 
equation, we get 
1 [ 1 m~ ] 1 [m~ ]- <p y = - 1- ---(1-'t) y+- -(I - 't) y - -
0' A. A. 0' A. 0' 
[ 
1 A.-l-m~(1-'t)] m~ - <p y 1- = -(1 - 't)y - -
0' A. O'A. 0' 
The ~ term shows up both in the numerator and the denominator in equation (16) and so it 
not immediately clear what the effect of ~ is on the growth rate of output. It can probably 
be better understood from the interaction of the different variables in the equation. I first 
review each of the variables in equation (16) and then try and look at possible effects of 
the ~ variable on growth of output. 
On the preference side, the variable <p measures the rate of time preference, while 
1/0' measures the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution in consumption. From the 
production side, the variable m, for the mark up of the lead firm in the industry, the tax 
rate 't, the level of productivity A., and the share of domestic financial intermediation ~, 
effect the growth rate of output. Dividing up the two terms in the numerator we get 
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L /' 
y = m ~(1- t )y _ A<P (17) 
crA - A + 1 + m ~(l- t) crA - A + 1 + m ~(l- t) 
Thus the value of ~ will depend on the relative sizes of the terms m~(l - t)y and the AV in 
the equation, so that the effect of the domestic financial variable ~ on the growth rate is 
indeterminate, and depends on the size of the variables in equ~tion (17). Looking at the 
rate of change of the growth rate of output, 'Y with respect to the share of domestic 
r- J,~)J 
( )( {(1'-X~t-1 _o<f_'--::-_ ~ !:~---n85- ) ?-
C 
we find that the ~ term only appears in the denominator and is squared, so that the effect 
of the variable is to always decrease the growth rate. So while we may not know the 
effect of the actual variable ~ on the growth rate, because of the first derivative it is clear 
that there will be diminishing returns for higher values of ~. 
In the next section I use the models derived in this and the last section, to test 
some of the effects of financial markets on developing country growth rates. I first look at 
the model in equation (12), that takes into account only the effects of domestic financial 
markets. The effect of the variable t is measured by using proxies to measure the effects 
of the efficiency of fmancial markets on the growth rate. Then, as in the theoretical model, 
I include other variables that could be used to measure the effects of foreign intervention 
in the financial sector and the proxies for the variable ~ are used to determine how the 
growth rate is effected by a combination of domestic and foreign financial intermedi~~~~') 
I • ~,( 
~' <'\ \t< ~ 
• ./ \:~ I It, (, f'i. ' 
'":{"i'" ,/ 
y:.,..1.tA,.A .. I J)' \ 





VI. Empirical Linkages between Finance and Growth 
The following pages cover some of the empirical work done to determine i) the 
linkages between different measures of the financial system and growth, ii) the link 
between foreign financial intermediation and the growth rate, and iii) look~-"'-'L~e 
emerging stock market data to see the effect of some of the mor~i~nt measures of 
"'--------- ---..-financial indicators on the growth rate in developing countries. Although there--are a 
number of problems in doing a study of the financial sector, the use of a number of 
techniques in this way allows us to better fe'~-6itte~e relationship between fmancial 
,/ 
intermediaries and growth. A number of different regressions are covered in the next few 
pages to give a better understanding of the interactions between financial markets and 
growth. 
6.1 Base Measures a/the Financial System 
The first part of this section reviews and extends the work done by King and 
Levine [1993] in examining the links between financial development and growth. It 
examines four different measures of financial development that cover a broad range of 
indicators looking at the state of the financial markets and the government policies 
towards these financial systems. Since the main problem in this type of a study of the 
financial sector is in constructing unambiguous measures of the state of the financial 
markets and the government policies towards financial activities, the use of four different 
'7 cJJ. cf ltSs,,[ns 
financial indicators solves this problem and therefore allows a better understanding of the 
relationship between financial intermediation and growth. 
Although the four financial indicators used in this study are the same as those used 
by King and Levine [1993], the production function used is based on a composite of 
physical and human capital as in Lucas [1988], rather than the more primitive model of 
productivity only dependent on the capital stock that is used by King and Levine. Thus, 
using this method for the empirical work that explicitly includes both a physical capital and 
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a human capital variable I was able to find improvements over the results from King and 
Levine for the given financial indicators. 
The data used in consists of a pooled cross-country, time-series sample of 70 
developing economies6 with data from 1970-1989. The four indicators can formally be 
defmed as follows: 
DEPTH The ratio of liquid liabilities of the financial system to GDP. 
Liquid liabilities equal M 1 plus interest bearing liabilities of the 
banking system, plus demand and interest bearing liabilities of 
the "non-bank" financial intermediaries. IFS line 551, or IFS 
lines 34+35.7 
BANK The ratio of deposit bank domestic credit divided by deposit 
bank domestic credit plus central bank domestic credit. IFS 
lines 22/(12+22).8 
PRIV IY The ratio of claims on the private sector by the Central Bank 
and Deposit Money Banks to GDP. IFS line 32d.9 
PRIVATE The ratio of claims on the non-financial private sector by the 
central bank and deposit banks to total domestic credit. IFS 
lines 32d1(32d+32a+32b+32c+32t).lO 
The measures above along with the other variables used in the regression were all 
averaged over 10 year periods giving two observations per country for the period from 
1970-1989. The first variable DEPTH, is a commonly used measure of the overall 
financial depth in an economy. It is essentially a measure of the amount ofM2 money and 
the intuition behind using it as a measure of the size of the financial sector comes from the 
assumption that there is a positive correlation between the size of the financial sector and 
the services that it provides. Thus the more money in the economy, the greater the need 
6See appendix A for a list of countries in the sample. Not all countries are included for all four measures 
of financial intermediation, due to lack of data for certain financial indicators. 
7Source: Financial Indicators and Growth in a Cross Section of Countries, King R. and Levine R., World 
Bank working paper. p.6. 
8Ibid. 
9Ibid. 
IOSource: King and Levine data set discription file. 
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for services to channel that money properly and therefore the greater the size of the 
financial sector. 
The DEPTH measure though clearly leaves something to be desired, as the channel 
through which it is assumed to have an effect is not well defined. By using the BANK 
variable it is possible to see the effect of deposit bank assets as a ratio of both deposit 
banks and the central bank assets. Since central banks are not likely to be involved in the 
sort of financial intermediation activities that we look at, then BANK should provide a 
better measure of the financial development in a country, as it essentially looks at the 
relative importance of commercial banking to central banking. 
The other two measures PRIV IY and PRIV ATE essentially measure the share of 
the total financiai"i~~;~n ~;~irfes that are allocated to the private sector. A 
-- ---- -- -- --- --














Summary Statistics for Regression Variablesa 
Mean 
L 0.039 














































a Data from 70 country sample using 2 observations for each lO-year average (1970-89). 
b GY = Real GDP Growth Rate, 
GL = Labor participation Growth Rate, 
GK = Capital stock Growth Rate. 
C Use only a 62 country sample due to lack of data for PRIVATE and BANK. 
d Variables explained in sub-section 6.2. 
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Table 2 
Correlation between Regression Variablesa 
Variable GY GL GK Depth Bank Priv/y Private 
GY 1.000 
GL 0.154 1.000 
GK 0.358 0.004 1.000 
Depth 0.086 0.241 0.099 1.000 
Bank 0.252 0.251 0.257 0.325 1.000 
Priv/y 0.183 
Private 0.187 
0.130 0.084 (61ID 0.494 1.000 
~--:') .. , :. --~ 
0.054 0.151 0.163 02]!3 ' . __ Q~ 47 · 1.000 
aUsing 1970-89 period. IJ. I Y"~;' 
t,. fl f/ ,:} .1 
owned sector, to provide funding for SOEs, woJid ;;obably not have the desired effect. 
So these variables explain how the asset distribution by the financial system between the 
public and private sectors will increase growth. Thus, in countries where more of the 
r credit is allocated to the private sector, as opposed to government and SOEs one would 
h('·,.(,h" ~'
!~;: ,,~, .~' expect to see~.':re deveIOP~~ifiCalIY. PRlYIY looks at the credit allocated to the 
"tl' V private sector as ~. ~hare of the GDP, while PRIVATE looks at the dj.~tR~utioIl, of.credit .d(" c ",,'It ,( 
~{V.. (,t'" . i C <; I~ ,.. < ·r .. , 'ft, :i'T' ~ 
~ ~ ~ . 
. I' \)'v from-the go';emment-and the public..sec1:or to the private sector~ It should be noted that 
I" II 
these measures may actually only be indicators of the relative size of the private sector, 
rather than any meaningful measure of the financial sector performance. 
Using the above measures as the various indicators of financial markets in 
developing countries, I then proceeded to estimate the effect of the financial indicators on 
the GDP growth rate of the pooled cross-section, time series data. Using ordinary least 
squares to relate the growth rate of GDP (GY), to the growth rate of the labor force 
P~GL). the growth rate of the capital stock (GK~ and a variable for the 
fmancial indicator (in the regression below DEPTH is used), along with an average for the 
secondary school enrollment rates (SEC), a dummy variable for Africa, and a measure of 
the number of assassinations (ASSASS): 
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. - ---J~\l1,4( 
GY = 0.445(GL) + 0.489( GK) + O.025(DEP'flI) - O/~SI? ) - 0.0 J3(AFRICA) - 43.7(ASSASS)' 
(1.429) (3.926) (2.421) «-2.969)/ (-4.252) (-2.389) 
R2=O.254~' 
*(t-statistics are given in parenthesis below coefficients) 
The complete regression results are given in tables B.1 to B.4 in appendix Bll. 
Table B.1 shows various regressions using DEPTH as a measure of the size of the 
financial sector. In each of the regressions in this table, the financial variable is significant 
(at the 0.1 significance level for a two-tailed t-test) once we control for Africa, the 
secondary school enrollment rates and assassinations. While the panel data given in 
regressions (1) and (2) provides a good overview, the real differences between the 
variables show up mainly between regressions (3)-(4) and (5)-(6), which are separate 
cross-section regressions on the 1970-79 and 1980-89 data respectively. It is interesting 
to note that while financial depth had a large and significant effect on growth in the 1970- J V ll' I/'} 
79 decade, this effect becomes insignificant in the 1980-89 decade.Ghis means that IJ~ ~ffl" ( ~1\ 
, 
• ..L v",y.A . I 
'v~- ) ... /~ I 
overall financial depth decreased as we moved from the first decade to the second. On the . ()J 11.., 11 , ~.I1 
11' 'f :r, 
other hand, looking at table B.2, which uses the BANK variable (which measures the ~r (fifj,,', :>-
relative importance of the commercial and central banks) as the financial indicator, it is 
~ cr' fI I 
? fl' 
tY, r,# , / 
evident that BANK is insignificant in the 1970-79 decade, but becomes significant in the 
1980-89 decade. This means that while the measure of DEPTH showed a decrease in the 
total effect of the financial sector from one decade to the next, the BANK variable showed 
that the role of banks increased from the 1970 decade to the 1980 decade in its effect on 
the growth rate. Interestingly. th~ is also much higher in the 1980 
decade, showing ~ that the share of ~ate banking has an important effect on ~rowth. 
It is also worth noting the dramatic change in the value of R 2, in both tables B.l and B.2 
from the first decade to the second, where it changes from about 0.2 to 0.45. 
llWhen referring to the regressions from appendix B in the following pages, I refer to the regressions that 
control for africa. asssassinations and secondary school rates, unless otherwise noted. 
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Tables B.3 and B.4look at separating the effect of the private sector side 
involvement in financial development. The PRIV IY variable is significant for the cross-
section, time series sample and for the 1980 decade. Thus the effect of the financial 
indicator is more pronounced in the second decade. As with the BANK variable the 
higher effect of PRIVIY comes about due to the there being a ·higher share of the financial / 
intermediation being done by private banks, and this is more so in the 1980 decade, as 
opposed to the decade before. Also once again the R2 value is much higher for 1980-89 
than for either the panel data or the 1970-79 data, showing that not only is the effect of 
f'vVJ Mt a/:;?!?; ~Itv. J..L-t4- ~~ 
PRIV IY larger and more significant for this period but that the-data alse bette! fit for the 
model. The PRIVATE variable, which looks at ratio of claims on the non-financial private 
sector gives similar results. The 1970 decade variable is in~ignificant, while the 1980 
de[~~~:sc~~~~~ant at the 0.1 significance level. In both tables, the [mancial variable has 
a ijjgher effect in the pooled regression (1970-89), than in the second decade alone. This 
would imply that the effect as a whole on the growth rate is greater than it is separately for 
each of the decades. 
All four of the measures used show a significant and positive effect on the growth 
rate, when the pooled data set is used. This clearly shows that there is a relationship 
between the rate of growth of GDP and the different financial indicators. first, the 
inclusion of a measure of secondary school enrollment rates, a dummy variable for Africa 
and a measure of political stability have a significant effect on the result~ Second, all the 
pooled sample measures are significant, and the decade measures are significant either for 
one decade or the other. In fact the R2 is much higher for the regressions in the 1980s 
decade than for the 1970s decade. in every case, showing that changes in these variables in 
Ali f 'Jv,V--r:. J' ~ ,,/ {)?(.t"tt.h-h;'r -fr.,,-- Cn)f-lt(AA.:"-~'.r:.R.",~l.f ·;'" /-'vJ ~vll>J'l fe./--, 
the 1980~.,b~9·,an . , y; . h ratel!..he reason for this, as 
explained earlier, is because of the shift from financial intermediaries directing credit to 
SOEs in the 1970s to a move towards more lending to the private sector in the 1980s, as 
is reflected in the dat~Third, the inclusion of the growth of capital variable has a 
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significant and positive effect, and the results using this model specification of the 
production function gives us better results than would have been obtained by King and 
Levine [1993] using similar data. Overall these results provide fairly convincing evidence 
of both the overall positive effect of the financial intermediaries on the growth rate over 
the two decade pooled sample, and the separate decade effects of different measures of 
the fmancial intermediation. 
6.2 Incorporating Foreign Financial Intermediation 
l)-j /1/7 ! fY') "4< 
This sub-section examines three different measures of foreign fmancial~ 
'7 
into a developing country economy and its effect on the growth rate. From the model 
derived in section V, the relationship between the measure of local financial intermediation 
~, (a fraction that measures the share of local financial intermediation offered), and the 
growth rate was determined. In this section, I use the variables for financial 
intermediation from the previous section and include other variables that incorporate the 
effect that foreign investments through the use of foreign financial intermediaries have on 
the GDP growth rate. The three variables that are used are the total external debt, growth 
of debt and the current account deficit, and can be defined as follows: 
DEBT: The ratio of total external debt to GDP. The debt statistics are 
presented by type of borrower instead of type of creditor. The 
source of the data is the World Bank World Debt Tables from 
the Socio-economic time-series access and retrieval system. 
GDEBT: This is calculated from the DEBT statistic above, and is simply 
the growth rate of the total external debt. 
CURAC: This is the sum of the net exports of goods and nonfactor 
services, net factor service income, and net private transfers. 
Source is the World Bank World Debt Tables. 
The same data set that was used in sub-section 6.1 was used in the regressions below 
adding DEBT, GDEBT and CURAC as measures of foreign financial intermediation. I 
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Table 3 
Correlation between Regression Variables a 
Variable GY GL GK Debt GDebt CurAc DebtSq 
GY 1.000 ,t j 
GL 0.127 1.000 
",.)...11 "", ," ' t'" 0, . \ 
GK 0.357 -0.034 1.000 
. I' I 
f\J{'" ('\,( 
f i' ~ , 
Debt -0.317 0.162 -0.247 1.000 jp/, 
GDebt -0.134 -0.024 -0.045 0.009 1.000 
CurAc -0.234 -0.124 0.139 -0.615 -0.189 1.000 
~ 
DebtSq -0.266 0.106 -0.209 <.0.905 0.074 -0.574 1.000 --
aUsing 1970-89 period. 
used the same pooled cross-sectional time-series data with the 70 country sample and 
included the DEPTH and PRIVIY variables in~ach of the equations (as measures of 
domestic financial intermediation), and this allowed me to take into account the effect of 
both the domestic and foreign financial intermediation on development. ~ 
The use of the DEBT variable is essentially a proxy for the amount ofl~p~tal 
inflows into a developing country economy. Measuring the amount of accumulated debt 
for an economy means measuring the net accumulation of capital. The assumption that 
the loans, of which the debt is composed of, are used for development purposes, means 
that if these resources are properly allocated to entrepreneurs through the financial sector 
(as described in the theoretical model), then the use of this proxy should say something 
about the growth of the economy. However, because this is a measure of accumulated 
debt, it may not reflect the year to year capital flows. For example, a country with a high 
level of accumulated debt which may no longer be gaining the benefits of that money will 
still show a high value for DEBT. For this reason I have also used a measure of the 
growth rate of the debt, to see the year to year changes in the debt and so how the flows 
rather than the accumulated levels of capital effect the growth rate. The current account 




Growth and Foreign Financial Intennediation, 1970·89 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DEBT average -0.013 -0.011 
(-2.343) (-2.061) 
Growth of DEBT average -0.051 -0.057 
(-1.530) (-1.690) 
Current account 0.070 0.076 
(1.558) (1.708) 
~-
DEPTH average 0.026 0.025 0.023 
(2.502) (2.375) (2.168) 
PRIV IY average 0.044 0.050 0.045 
(2.050) (2.313) (2.095) 
R2 0.286 0.274 0.268 0.266 0.268 0.267 
Other dependent variables: Growth of labor. growth of capital. secondary school enrollment rates. Africa dummy 
variable and index for assassinations. Growth of GNP used as the dependent variable. 
,}.. I f /--4 I"'~~< ftA. 5 / . tt-'IM " 
Table 4 gives the ~lts for all the pooled cross-section time-series data 
sample. The total external DEBT variable is significant (at the 0;05 level) with either the 
DEPTH and PRIV IY variable included as the measure of domestic financial 
intermediation12. The DEBT variable has a negative coefficient, implying a 1.3% and a 
1,1 % negative effect on .the growth rate. Similarly, the variables for the growth of debt is 
negative, also showing that there is a negative effect on the growth of GDP from a higher 
/V-~ 
~ inflows. The current account balance shows a positive effect, but this again means 
a negative effect on the growth rate since a positive value here corresponds to a negative 
value for capital account inflows. In each of the cases, the domestic financial 
intermediation variables are significant at the 0.05 or higher level. This means that 
~ 
controlling for foreign inflows, the measures financial intermediati0ft show a strong 
positive effect on the growth rate. 
12Most of the other results for this sub-section. including complete regression results for each of the 
variables is given in Appendix C. 
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Table 5 /7) 
Growth and Foreign Financial Intermediati~n, 1970-79 /", 
I 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) , ____ (4y '· (5) (6) 
DEBT average -0.005 -0.015 
(-0.215) (-0.623) 
Growth of DEBT average -0.063 -0.079 
(-1.336) ( -1.646) 
Current account deficit -0.084 -0.004 
LIVI(" 
(-0.942) (-0.041) 
BANK average IA ;) 0.043 0.042 0.051 
\)~,- I (2.245) (2.215) (2.521) 
PRIV N average 0.050 0.056 0.050 
(1.212) (1.383) (1.206) 
R2 0.212 0.163 0.235 0.196 0.223 0.157 
Looking at Tables 5 and 6 it is apparent that the results for the 1970 decade and 
the 1980 decade vary greatly in terms of the affects of the proxies for foreign fmancial 
intermediation. The foreign inflow values for the 1970 decade generally have an 
insignificant effect on the growth rate and in fact the values of all but one of the foreign 
financial intermediation variables in the regressions are insignificant even at the O. to 
significance level. The values for the 1980 decade on the other hand are generally 
significant. This is especially true for the flow variables, which are the growth of debt and 
current account balance variables, and both are significant at the 0.05 level. The reason 
for this mainly has to do with the difference between the flow variables and the stock 
variables. As explained earlier, using the flow variables, the accumulated value from the 
previous period does not affect the current value of the variable so that this variable is only 
measuring the rate at which the total amount of the capital inflows are changing from one 
decade to the next. This is why the flow variables probably better reflect the changes 




Growth and Foreign Financial Intermediation, 1980-89 
Independent variables (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DEBT average -0.008 -0.007 
(-1.786) (-1.511) 
Growth of DEBT average -0.138 -0.128 
(-3.138) (-2.903) 
Current account deficit 0.091 0.084 
(2.284) (2.081) 
BANK average 0.017 0.015 0.014 
(1.762) (1.622) (1.437) 
PRIYIY average 0.041 0.035 0.036 
(2.071) (1.850) (1.810) 
R2 0.472 0.483 0.526 0.532 0.490 0.500 
The separate decades have an effect on the domestic financial variables that is 
similar to the results found in section 6.1. In every case~.t"': ::t;!. ~ • .J" 
become smaller and less significant from the 1970 decade to the 1980 decade. The 
PRIV IY variable on the other hand grows larger and more significant from the 1970 
decade to the 1980 decade. The reason for this is probably due to the there being a higher 
proportion of investment towards the private financial sector in the 1980s decade. Along 
with the higher values for the two foreign financial flow variables, this implies that in the 
1980s there was a greater effect of the foreign capital on the growth rate of a country an 
although there was a smaller to&fi~~tor (as DEPTII is smaller), the 
resources were being directed more and more towards the private sector (PRIV IY is 
positive and significant). 
These findings also explain the effect of ~, that was indeterminate in the theoretical 
model. From the derivations, in section V, we saw that there was an ambiguous 
relationship between the share of domestic financial intermediation and the growth rate of 
the economy. The empirical work here shows that there is a negative and significant 
relationship between the foreign financial variables and the growth rate. In fact the higher 
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Table 7 
Correlation between Growth and Stock Market Variablesa 
Variable GY GL GK StkCap StkTO 
GY 1.000 
GL 0.170 1.000 
GK 0.701 0.247 1.000 
Stock Capitalization 0.544 -0.053 0.346 1.000 
Stock Turnover 0.568 -0.034 0.491 0.821 1.000 
a Using 1980s emerging stock market data. 
value of the two flow variables in the 1980s decade suggests that there were changes 
taking place in the effect that capital coming into the economy was having on the rate of 
productivity growth. Comparing the regressions results from this sub-section to those in 
sub-section 6.1, it is apparent that the R2 is higher for the regressions where a measure of 
the foreign [mancial intermediation is included. This means that the when including 
foreign financial flows into the model, it provides a better overall picture of the effect on 
the growth rate of output. 
6.3 Emerging Stock Markets as measures of the Financial Sector 
This sub-section adds a new measure of financial intermediation to the set of 
measures used by King and Levine [1993]. Using data on 24 emerging stock markets for 
the 1980s, I have ~rical model used in sub-section 6.1 to see the affect on the 
growth rate of ~r measures of financial markets. The two measures of the emerging 
stock market that are used are the stock market capitalization rate (STKCAP) and the 
stock turnover rate (STKTO) and are defined as follows: 
STKCAP: This is the total market value of domestic companies listed on 
the local stock markets for each economy. Source: Emerging 
Stock Market Database, 1994. IMP. 
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STKTO: This ratio is a measure of the local stock market's percentage 
change in the stock index adjusted in terms of US dollars. 
Source: Emerging Stock Market Database, 1994. IMF. 
A cross-sectional sample was used, averaged over the 1980s decade, with data 
from 24 developing countries emerging stock markets. The use of stock market data is in 
many ways better th~_tlle-use of th~/vatfa61e-s-used earlier. This is because of the (~ [/) (} 
, / ) - ---- -'- -- ~ 
efficiency with which stock markets operate. Speclfic1i1IY.tlie stock market capitalization 
'. / -
t" 
is a measure of the' total size of the stock market and is therefore a proxy for the size of 
the financial market in terms of the efficiency with which it operates. The stock turnover 
rate is a good measure because it captures the activity in the stock market. An economy 
may have a large stock market but one where stocks do not frequently change hands. So 
a high turnover would be associated with a more active stock market and therefore more 
financial activity in the economy. 
The results for the stock market variables are given in appendix D, where I have 
summarized the effects from including the STKCAP and the STKTO variables in the 
regressions. The coefficients on both of the stock market variables have positive signs and 
their coefficients are significant. These variables are good proxies for the level of 
development of financial markets, and the correlation between the two variables adds to 
the evidence supporting financial sector development in LDCs. Looking at the variables 
I pI 
t~r /"// 
rate with an R2 value of about 0.725, when co~trolrng, for s,e, condary school enrollment 
(' Ju, ' "vl. lA-yv5 
rates, Africa dummy and assassinations. \ The v ~e stock market turnover also 
separately, we see that the model seems to fit better for the stock market capitalization 
has a high R2 value at about 0.7! In comparison to measures of financial development 
used in sub-section 6.1, these variables fit the empirical model much better with high t-
statistic values and high R2s. However, only a 24 country sample averaged over 1 decade 
was used, and since only countries with stock markets can be used, this has an inherent 
fr'~' .. 1 ;. 
('f" ) ).t AS 
CfJvr-
. l'~ 70 
f'¥ I}O 
~ (I 
biases in it. So only countries which already have some development in the financial sector "ptY ' 
can be included in the sample of emerging stock markets this limits the interpretation of 
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the results. Even then, comparing these-re§ults with DEPTH and PRIV IY variables, for 
-- -~---
the same sample of countries, the STKCAP and STKTO-stillfn the model better than 
other variables. -----------
VII. Conclusions 
This paper takes a model of financial systems and the growth rate of output by 
King and Levine [1993] and develops it further to include a measure of the effect of 
having an open economy, where foreign financial intennediaries may lend to [mIlS in the 
domestic economy. In developing the King and Levine model the paper describes four 
ways in which financial intennediaries increase productivity growth. It describes the need 
for financial intennediaries to evaluate prospective entrepreneurs and mobilize resources 
to finance promising projects. It also examines the role of financial intennediaries in 
diversifying risks and helping in the innovation activity, which leads to better products and 
more growth. Thus in the simple closed economy case, the need for these services leads 
to financial intennediaries having a positive effect on the rate of productivity growth. 
Allowing for the effect of foreign financial intennediaries, in an open economy model, it is 
less clear what the effect of the foreign financial systems would be on the growth rate of 
the economy. The model is developed with the amount of labor resources need to run the 
financial sector decreased when foreign financial markets are introduced. 
The empirical work was broken down into three sections. The first used the four 
measures of financial intennediation used by King and Levine [1993] and added a measure 
of the growth of capital in the production function 13, which give results with higher R2 
than would have been obtained using the King and Levine empirical model. While the 
pooled cross-section time-series sample showed that all four financial variables to be 
significant, the separate decade data went beyond this to show that while financial depth, 
the measure of the total [mancial size, decreased, the variables measuring the share of 
13This was implicitly assumed as in Romer [1990]. 
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private investment increased in their effect on the growth rate from the 1970 decade to the 
1980 decade, as did the share of banking activity in the financial system. The empirical 
work on foreign financial intermediation using the debt, growth of debt and the current 
account balance also gave significant results. All three variables showed that there was a 
negative relationship between the measures of foreign financial capital inflows and the 
growth rate of output in the developing economy. Moreover the data also showed that 
when taking the two decades separately, the effect of the foreign financialjlows were 
higher for the 1980 decade than the 1970 decade. 
The stock market data provides yet another measure of the effect of the financial 
sector on the growth rate of output. There is clearly a significant effect on the growth 
rate, using either of the measures of emerging stock markets. The R2 values are also high 
here and this may be reflective of developing countries which have stock markets, where 
financial markets may already have a certain level of development. 
In conclusion, this study has improved on the work by King and Levine [1993] by 
using a different empirical model that showed some important effects of the developing 
country financial system on the rate of growth of output. The work has also developed a 
model that describes the effect of foreign financial intermediation on the growth rate. 
However, further work needs to be done in this area, not only to find better measures of 
foreign fmancial intervention, but also to see the effects of the flow of foreign capital in 
future decades, when the long-term results of economic growth through entrepreneurship 
can be seen. 
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Developing Country List 
70 Country Samplea 
1 DZA Algeria 24 HND Honduras 47 PHI.. Philippines§ 
2 ARG Argentina§ 25 IND India§ 48 PRT Portugal§ 
3 BGD Bangladesh§ 26 IDN Indonesia§ 49 RWA Rwanda 
4 BRB Barbados 27 JAM Jamaica§ 50 SLE Sierra Leone 
5 BOL Boliviat 28 JaR Jordan§ 51 SaM Somaliat 
6 BWA Botswanat 29 KEN Kenya 52 LKA Sri Lanka§ 
7 BRA Brazil§ 30 KOR Korea§ 53 SDN Sudant 
8 BDI Burundi 31 LBR Liberia 54 SWZ Swaziland 
9 CMR Cameroon 32 MDG Madagascar 55 SYR Syria 
lO CAF Cent. Afr. Rep. 33 MWI Malawi 56 1ZA Tanzania 
11 TCD Chad 34 MYS Malaysia§ 57 THA Thailand§ 
12 COL Colombia§ 35 MLI Mali 58 TOO Togo 
13 COG Congo 36 MLT Maltat 59 ITO Trin. & Tabago§ 
14 ClY Cote D'Ivoire§ 37 MRT Mauritania 60 TUN Tunisia§ 
15 DaM Dominican Rep. 38 MUS Mauritius 61 TUR Turkey§ 
16 ECU Ecuadort 39 MAR Morocco§ 62 UGA Uganda 
17 EGY Egypt 40 NIC Nicaragua 63 URY Uruguay§ 
18 ETH Ethiopia 41 NER Niger 64 VEN Venezuela§ 
19 GAB Gabon 42 NGA Nigeria§ 65 YEM Yement 
20 GMB Gambia 43 OMN Oman 66 ZAR Zaire 
21 GHA Ghana 44 PAK Pakistan§ 67 2MB Zambia 
22 GTM Guatemala 45 PRY Paraguayt 68 GUY Guyana 
23 HTI Haiti 46 PER Peru§ 69 BEN Benin 
70 HVO Burkina Faso 
a Covers period from 1970-1989. 
t These countries are!!21 included in any of the regressions involving either BANK or PRIVATE as this data was not 
available for these countries in the either the 1970-79 sample, the 1980-89 sample or both, and was removed from 
all the regressions involving these for consistency. 







Secondary school enrollment 
Dummy for Africa 
Number of assassinations 
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T~le B.l 
Growth and ~ancia~ 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) kJ~j r 
C/rJ--f'i"'~ 
0.010 0.029 0.0210.046 
(1.159) (2.718) (1.547) (2.796) 
0.495 0.445 0.676 0.589 
(1.534) (1.429) (1.386) (1.241) 
0.549 0.489 0.047 0.056 
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Table B.2 
Growth and Ratio of Deposit Bank Domestic Credit 
IndeEendent variables (1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I I C 0.003 0.018 
\ 0.000 
0.036 0.000 0.006 
(0.292) (1.591) (1.402) (2.089) I (0.044) (0.477) GL 0.444 0.395 0.826 0.635 0.187 0.224 
(1.471) (1.327) 1(1.743) (1.336) I (0.567) (0.673) , 
GK 0.392 0.334 \-0.026 -0.068 0.817 0.794 
(3.229) (2.785) (-0.148) (-0.385) I (4.975) (4.757) 
BANK average 0.023 0.025 \0.007 0.010 \ 0.020 0.024 
(1.880) (2.083) Cp.365) (0.482L _ 0 .617) __ . (1.853) 
~---- --- .-~-
Secondary school enrollment -0.024 -0.009 -0.018 
(-1.931) (-0.318) (-1.450) 
Dummy for Africa -0.012 -0.016 -0.003 
(-4.209) (-3.681) (-2.468) 
Number of assassinations -37.399 -35.821 -24.387 
(-2.323) (-1.332) (-1.433) 







/ \ Table B.3 / 
Growth and Financial Claims on Private Sector 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
C 0.009 0.029 0.023 0.046 0.003 0.009 
(1.037) (2.671) (1 .540) (2.713) (0.360) (0.761) 
GL 0.511 0.456 0.728 0.623 0.379 0.371 
(1.583) (1.460) (1.452) (1.271) (1.129) (1.118) 
GK 0.558 0.499 0.079 0.085 0.925 0.906 
(4.342) (4.003) (0.394) (0.434) (5.590) (5 .501) 
PRIVN average 0.033 0.049 0.043 0.051 0.023 0.044 
(1.697),,-,,- -,, (2.415) (1.193) (1.220) (1.257) (2.169) 
Secondary school enrollment -0.043 -0.045 -0.025" 
(-2.985) (-1.374) (:1·93~ 




-----Number of assassinations -39.217 -43.766 -23.439 
(-2.125) (-1.354) (-1.310) 
R2 0.1660 0.2487 0.0599 0.1574 0.3939 0.4616 
Table B.4 
Growth and Claims on Non-Financial Private Sector 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
C 0.002 0.017 0.016 0.032 0.002 0.009 
(0.171) (1.537) (1.109) (1.860) (0.156) (0.719) 
GL 0.564 0.523 0.868 0.704 0.247 0.285 
(1.914) (1.798) (1.970) (1.597) (0.748) (0.855) 
GK 0.409 0.355 -0.023 -0.058 0.840 0.817 
(3.483) (3.056) (-0.131) (-0.337) (5.242) (4.952) 
PRIVA1E average 0.024 0.026 0.015 0.015 0.020 0.022 
_._J4,2431 ___ (2.414) (0.891)(Q&~9J_{1.666) (1.848) 
Secondary school enrollment -'0.023-- ······--·_·· .. - ~o:oo~r" ....... .... - -0.018 ·-----·· 
(-1.880) (-0.333) (-1.431) 
Dummy for Africa -0.012 -0.016 -0.004-
(-4.248) (-3.678) (-2.662) 
Number of assassinations -37.405 -35.507 -25.423 
(-2.339) (-1.333) (-1.497) 
0.178 0.244 0.086 0.167 0.408 0.456 
(1) Pooled cross-sectional time-series sample (1970-89). 
(2) Pooled cross-sectional time-series sample (1970-89), controlling for secondary school, Africa and Assassin. 
(3) Cross-sectional data from 1970-1979 only. 
(4) Cross-sectional data from 1970-1979. controlling for secondary school, Africa and Assassin. 
(5) Cross-sectional data from 1980-1989 only. 
(6) Cross-sectional data from 1980-1989. controlling for secondary school, Africa and Assassin. 
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Table B.S 
Summary Statistics for 1970-79 decade Variablesa 
Variableb Mean V t~ Std. dev'N!-''' inimum 
GY 0.051 0.030 )i" [ -0.016 
GL 0.024 0.008 0.002 
GK 0.028 0.019 -0.003 
DEBT 0.282 0.160 0.056 
GDEBT 0.119 0.083 -0.034 
CURAC -0.036 0.048 -0.221 
DEPTH (-6270 0.216 0.039 
BANKe 0.648 0.179 0.249 
PRIVATEe 0.532 0.195 0.097 
PRIVIY 0.165 0.107 0.024 
a Data from 70 country cross sectional sample using a lO-year average (1970-79). 















































a Data from 70 country cross sectional sample using a 10-year average (1980-89). 
e Use only a 62 country sample due to lack of data for PRIVATE and BANK. 
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Growth and Total External Debt 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
C 0.028 0.029 0.046 0.048 0.009 0.009 
(2.698) (2.694) (2.776) (2.750) (0.765) (0.803) 
GL 0.582 0.582 0.617 0.704 0.499 0.458 
(1.869) (1.852) (1.244) (1.382) (1.485) (1.373) 
GK 0.426 0.445 0.060 0.097 0.862 0.883 
(3.404) (3 .532) (0.315) (0.490) (5 .150) (5.394) 
External Debt -0.013 -0.011 -0.005 -0.015 -0.008 -0.007 
(-2.343) (-2.061) (-0.216) (-0.623) (-1.786) (-1.511) 
DEPTH 0.026 0.044 0.017 
(2.502) (2.243) (1.762) 
PRlVN 0.044 0.050 0.041 
(2.050) (1.211 ) (2.071) 
Secondary school enrollment -0.031 -0.032 -0.056 -0.044 -0.014 -0.020 
(-2.138) (-2.149) (-1.772) (-1.327) (-1.110) (-1.472) 
Dummy for Africa -0.009 -0.011 -0.023 -0.023 0.004 0.003 
(-1.500) (-1.799) (-2.284) (-2.221) (0.615) (0.454) 
Number of assassinations -34.548 -31.361 -42.747 -41.658 -19.198 -15.360 
(-1.877) (-1.686) (-1.358) (-1.275) (-1.026) (-0.831) 
R2 0.286 0.274 0.212 0.163 0.472 0.483 
Table C.2 
Growth and Current Account Balance 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
C 0.030 0.030 0.047 0.047 0.014 0.014 
(2.838) (2.792) (2.864) (2.671) (1.246) (1.224) 
GL 0.518 0.533 0.460 0.618 0.418 0.394 
(1.654) (1.701 ) (0.932) (1.211) (1.284) (1.220) 
GK 0.470 0.477 0.052 0.085 0.860 0.874 
(3.775) (3.831) (0.273) (0.429) (5.232) (5.428) 
Current Account Balance 0.070 0.076 -0.085 -0.004 0.091 0.084 
(1.558) (1.708) (-0.943) (-0.042) (2.284) (2.081) 
DEP1H 0.023 0.051 0.014 
(2.168) (2.522) (1 .437) 
PRIVN 0.045 0.050 0.036 
(2.095) (1.205) (1.810) 
Secondary school enrollment -0.039 -0.040 -0.065 -0.045 -0.021 -0.025 
(-2.786) (-2.841) (-2.018) (-1.361) (-1.674) (-1.947) 
Dummy for Africa -0.012 -0.012 -0.027 -0.025 0.001 0.001 
(-1.964) (-2.122) (-2.565) (-2.266) (0.193) (0.126) 
Number of assassinations -37.426 -32.665 -47.787 -44.000 -18.397 -14.752 
(-2.006) (-1.746) (-1.518) (-1.330) (-1.010) (-0.825) 
R2 0.268 0.267 0.224 0.157 0.490 0.500 
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Table C.3 
Growth and Growth of External Debt 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
C 0.034 0.034 0.052 0.053 0.018 0.018 
(3.039) (3 .028) (3.065) (3.055) (1.616) (1.602) 
GL 0.446 0.454 0.625 0.664 0.354 0.336 
(1.439) (1.466) (1.325) (1 .373) (1.125) (1.076) 
GK 0.501 0.512 0.026 0.049 0.954 0.965 
(4.040) (4.131) (0.137) (0.253) (6.012) (6.173) 
Growth of External Debt -0.051 -0.057 -0.063 -0.080 -0.138 -0.128 
(-1.530) (-1.690) (-1.337) (-1.647) (-3 .138) (-2.903) 
DEPTH 0.025 0.042 0.015 
(2.375) (2.215) (1.622) 
PRIVIY 0.050 0.057 0.035 
(2.313) (1.384) (1.850) 
Secondary school enrollment -0.042 -0.044 -0.053 -0.045 -0.019 -0.022 
(-3.022) (-3.105) (-1.715) (-1.386) (-1.571 ) (-1.828) 
Dummy for Africa -0.012 -0.013 -0.020 -0.020 0.004 0.003 
(-1.987) (-2.161) (-1.996) (-1.971) (0.659) (0.534) 
Number of assassinations -41.856 -37.045 -44.963 -44.760 -16.844 -12.990 
(-2.293) (-2.018) (-1.455) (-1.406) (-0.967) (-0.755) 
R2 0.268 0.266 0.236 0.196 0.526 0.532 
Table C.4 
Growth and External Debt and Growth of Debt 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
C 0.033 0.033 0.053 0.055 0.017 0.017 
(3.021) (3.050) (3.069) (3.135) (1.515) (1.540) 
GL 0.582 0.579 0.682 0.775 0.410 0.380 
(1.878) (1.857) (1.380) (1.545) (1.278) (1.189) 
GK 0.439 0.458 0.033 0.063 0.931 0.949 
(3.517) (3 .659) (0.171) (0.321) (5 .780) (5.984) 
External Debt -0.013 -0.011 -O.OlD -0.021 -0.004 -0.003 
(-2.339) (-2.054) (-0.420) (-0.851) (-0.921) (-0.717) 
Growth of External Debt -0.051 -0.056 -0.066 -0.085 -0.124 -0.117 
(-1.533) (-1.685) (-1.375) (-1.738) (-2.670) (-2.523) 
DEPTII 0.025 0.041 0.016 
(2.456) (2.068) (1.696) 
PRIVIY 0.045 0.057 0.035 
(2.119) (1.387) (1.818) 
Secondary school enrollment -0.031 -0.034 -0.051 -0.043 -0.016 -0.020 
(-2.210) (-2.265) (-1.616) (-1.327) (-1.293) (-1.570) 
Dummy for Africa -0.008 -0.009 -0.019 -0.019 0.005 0.004 
(-1.258) (-1.518) (-1.838) (-1.748) (0.869) (0.682) 
Number of assassinations -32.743 -29.310 -43.812 -41.976 -13.096 -9.985 
(-1.785) (-1.584) (-1.402) (-1.308) (-0.731) (-0.561) 
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a Using a 24 Country Sample. See appendix A for list of the countri~s. 
(1) Cross-sectional base regression. 
(2) Base regression. controlling for secondary school. Africa and assassinations. 






























(4) Cross-sectional with stock market capitalization controlling for secondary school, Africa and assassin. 
(5) Cross-sectional regression with stock market turnover. 
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